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ABSTRACT
People are more willing to bet on their own judgments when they feel skillful or knowledgeable
(Heath and Tversky (1991)). We investigate whether this "competence effect" influences trading
frequency and home bias. We find that investors who feel competent trade more often and have a
more internationally diversified portfolio. We also find that male investors, and investors with higher
income or more education, are more likely to perceive themselves as competent investors than are
female investors, and investors with lower income or less education. Our results are unlikely to be
explained by other hypotheses, such as overconfidence or information advantage. Finally, we
















Investor competence is a common thread that ties together two important puzzles in 
international and financial economics – the home bias problem (too little is invested outside of 
the home market) and the trading frequency problem (investors trade far too often). In a world 
where investors’ subjective probability distributions are ambiguous, psychological factors such as 
perceived competence can play an important role in explaining investor behavior. Using survey 
data, we measure perceived competence and show that it is an economically important variable 
that helps explain these important puzzles. 
A large literature in psychology has studied behavior when the probability distribution of 
the outcome of a lottery is ambiguous (Camerer and Weber (1992)).  Ellsberg (1961) identifies 
the concept of ambiguity aversion, which occurs when people prefer to bet on lotteries with 
known probabilities of winning, rather than lotteries with ambiguous outcome distributions.   
Heath and Tversky (1991) identify a related concept, the competence effect, which posits that 
ambiguity aversion is affected by the subjective competence level of participants. When people 
feel skillful or knowledgeable in an area, they would rather bet on their own judgment (even 
though it is ambiguous) than on an equiprobable chance event (e.g., drawing balls from an urn 
with known contents), even though the outcome of the chance event has an unambiguous 
probability distribution. However, when participants do not feel competent, they prefer to bet on 
the unambiguous chance event. Therefore, the effects of ambiguity aversion are conditional on 
the subjective competence level of participants. 
The competence effect is best illustrated using an example (from Heath and Tversky 
(1991)). In their experiment, a participant answers a set of knowledge questions concerning 
history, geography, or sports.  For each question, the participant is asked to report his or her 
confidence in the answer, i.e., the subjective probability that his or her given answer is correct.   3
Finally the participant is presented with two choices, either to bet on his or her own answer, or to 
bet on a lottery in which the probability of winning is the same as the stated confidence. Heath 
and Tversky find that when people feel very knowledgeable about the subject matter (i.e., they 
feel ‘competent’), they are more likely to bet on their own judgments rather than the matched-
chance lottery. When people feel less knowledgeable, however, they tend to choose the matched-
chance lottery.     
The competence effect is particularly relevant to investor behavior.  In financial markets, 
investors are constantly required to make decisions based on ambiguous, subjective probabilities.  
It is likely that their educational background and other demographic characteristics make some 
investors feel more competent than others in understanding the array of financial information and 
opportunities available to them.  In the first part of this paper, we explore the relation between 
investor characteristics and self-rated competence. In most behavioral economics research, the 
underlying psychological bias is not observed directly, and therefore, these studies have to proxy 
for the bias.  A well-known example is found in Barber and Odean (2001), where gender is used 
as a proxy for degree of overconfidence. Ours is among the few behavioral finance papers that 
directly measure the underlying psychological bias. Using data from several UBS/Gallup Investor 
Surveys, we measure investor competence through survey responses. This allows us to 
empirically model competence as determined by a set of investor characteristics, e.g., gender, 
education, and income.  We find that male investors, and investors with higher income and more 
education, are more likely to believe they are competent than are female investors, and those with 
less income and education. 
We also study the link between competence and investor behavior.  Most empirical 
behavioral economics research studies one psychological bias to explain one type of investor 
behavior. While these studies provide important insights, they do not directly compare which 
biases are relatively more important in affecting investor behavior. Furthermore, if a   4
psychological bias is deeply ingrained, it should affect multiple aspects of investor decision-
making. Our paper takes a first step towards addressing these issues. We study two types of 
investor behavior, namely trading frequency and home bias. Although there exist extensive 
literatures on both trading frequency and home bias, these two phenomena have always been 
treated separately. In this paper, we argue that these two aspects of behavior are driven (at least in 
part) by the same underlying psychological bias, namely, the competence effect.
1 
With regard to trading frequency, we hypothesize that investors who feel more competent 
tend to trade more frequently than investors who feel less competent.  This occurs because 
investors who feel more knowledgeable in making financial decisions should be more willing to 
act on their judgments (Heath and Tversky (1991)).  Our empirical results are consistent with this 
hypothesis.   
We argue that the competence effect also contributes to home bias.  Home bias refers to the 
tendency to overweight domestic equities and underweight international equities in investment 
portfolios (see, e.g., French and Poterba (1991)).  When an investor feels competent about 
understanding the benefits and risks involved in investing in foreign assets, he is more willing to 
invest in foreign securities.  In contrast, when an investor feels less competent, he is more likely 
to avoid foreign assets.  Consistent with these predictions, our results suggest that investors with 
more competence are more likely to invest in international assets.   
We are careful to investigate alternative behavioral mechanisms that could account for 
similar effects. Our results suggest that overconfidence, while correlated with competence, does 
not subsume the competence effect. We also investigate a measure of optimism in the context of 
the home bias problem. We provide what we believe is the first evidence of a direct link between 
                                                 
1Kumar and Lim (2004) argue that one psychological bias, narrow framing, is responsible for two 
biases, namely the disposition effect and underdiversified portfolios.   5
optimism towards the domestic market and home bias. While the optimism factor is important, 
the evidence on the importance of competence is robust to including optimism in the model.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews related literature and 
develops our hypotheses in more detail.  Section III discusses the data.  Section IV presents the 
empirical analysis.  Some concluding remarks are offered in the final section. 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
II.A. Ambiguity Aversion and the Competence Effect  
The classic example of ambiguity aversion is found in Ellsberg (1961).  Consider two urns, 
one containing 50 red balls and 50 black balls, and the other containing 100 balls in unknown 
combination of red and black.  A participant can choose to draw one ball from either urn, and 
guess its color.  The participant receives a positive payoff if and only if he guesses correctly.  
Ellsberg finds that people would rather bet on the first urn (the known probability event) than on 
the second urn (the ambiguous event).     
In the Ellsberg setting, participants are asked to choose between two chance events, with 
no subjectivity involved.  In financial markets, however, investors make decisions based on 
subjective probabilities.  For example, an investor might need to determine the probability of 
IBM’s stock price decreasing by at least $1 if the Fed raises short-term interest rates by 25 basis 
points.  Does ambiguity aversion hold under subjective probabilities?  According to Heath and 
Tversky (1991), the answer to this question depends on the investor’s subjective competence 
level.  When people feel skillful or knowledgeable, they prefer to bet on their own judgment (an   6
ambiguous event) versus betting on an equiprobable chance event (a known probability event).  
In contrast, when they do not feel skillful or knowledgeable, they prefer the chance event.
2   
The competence effect can be illustrated with an experiment.  Participants first report their 
subjective knowledge level about the game of football.  Next, they are asked to predict the winner 
of a football game and also report their subjective probabilities of the predictions being correct.  
Then they are asked to choose between two bets, either to bet on their own judgment, or a lottery 
that provides an equal chance of winning.  In this example, subjective competence is captured in 
two dimensions: the self-rated knowledge level, and the subjective probability of the football 
prediction being correct.  The results of this experiment are shown in Figure I (adapted from 
Heath and Tversky (1991)).  The percentage of participants choosing to bet on their own 
judgments increases with both measures of subjective competence.  When subjects feel that they 
are highly competent in predicting the results of football games, they prefer to bet on their own 
judgment.  In fact, even when presented with a lottery with a greater chance of winning, they 
would still prefer to bet on their football predictions.  In other words, they are willing to pay a 
premium to bet on their own judgments.  When people do not feel competent, however, they 
prefer the matched chance lotteries.   
In the long-established economic tradition of expected utility theory, only the probability 
distribution of the payoff matters; the confidence that the agent has over the distribution is 
irrelevant.  In other words, preferences and probability distributions are assumed to be 
independent of each other.  The psychology literature cited above offers evidence to the contrary.  
People are more willing to act on their judgments when they feel more competent in the area.  In 
other words, beliefs and preferences are not independent, they are entangled.
3 
                                                 
2Fox and Tversky (1995) and Fox and Weber (2002) provide further evidence that subjective 
feeling of competence plays a role in the willingness to act on one’s own judgment. 
3See review papers by see Shoemaker (1982), Camerer (1995), and Starmer (2000) for summaries 
of other challenges to expected utility theory and new types of preferences that have been   7
In financial markets, not all investors feel equally competent in making investment 
decisions.  In general, an investor with a high school education and annual income of less than 
$25,000 may feel less competent as an investor relative to a highly-educated investor with a much 
higher income. It is worthwhile emphasizing that competence is a self-perceived skill or 
knowledge, not necessarily the investor’s true level of skill or information. For example, an 
advanced degree in any subject might make a person feel smart and insightful, and such a person 
might therefore feel competent towards many things in general, including making financial 
decisions.     
There is an avenue for overconfidence to affect investment decisions within the framework 
of competence theory (in addition to overconfidence potentially having an independent effect). 
Within the context of the football betting example mentioned above, consider a bettor whose 
empirical success in picking winners is 70 percent.  If the bettor is not overconfident, he would 
correctly perceive himself to be accurate 70 percent of the time.  The competence effect states 
that the bettor would prefer to bet on his football picks versus being rewarded for selecting a red 
ball from an urn with 70 red balls out of a total of 100 balls. Overconfidence can distort an 
investor’s subjective probabilities, which accentuates the competence effect. For example, 
overconfidence might inflate the investor’s subjective probability that he will pick a winner from 
70 percent to 80 percent.
4  In this case, the overconfident bettor would prefer to a greater degree 
to bet on his football picks versus picking from an urn with 70 red balls.  In fact, the bettor would 
prefer his picks relative to being rewarded for selecting a red ball from an urn with 80 red balls. 
                                                                                                                                                 
proposed in light of these challenges. In a recent paper, Polkovnichenko (2005) uses new 
preferences to explain household portfolio allocations. 
4In the psychology literature, overconfidence can mean either believing that the distribution of 
your knowledge is tighter than it actually is or, believing that your mean skill is higher than it 
actually is.  In the text, we use the term overconfidence in a general sense, though the meaning 
should be clear by the context of the surrounding text.  As explained in the next footnote, when 
we explicitly refer to distributions that are too tight, we use the term miscalibration.    8
In the empirical analysis that follows, we test for the effects of overconfidence that flow through 
the competence channel, and also test for a separate overconfidence effect. 
As described next, we argue that the level of competence an investor feels in making 
financial decisions changes his willingness to act on his judgments, and therefore is an important 
determinant of investor choices. We focus on two well-documented investment anomalies: too 
frequent trading and home bias. 
 
II.B. Competence and Trading Frequency  
Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000, 2002) argue that investors tend to trade too 
often.  In addition, the evidence suggests that single, young, male investors trade the most 
frequently (Barber and Odean (2001)).  This high trading activity is usually attributed to the 
psychological bias of investor overconfidence.  In the finance literature, overconfidence is usually 
defined as overestimating the precision of information about the value of a financial security 
(Odean (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001)).  This ‘miscalibration’ leads to intensified differences 
of opinion among investors, which in turn causes trading (Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv 
(1993)).
5 
The empirical link between overconfidence and trading frequency has been studied 
extensively in recent research. Existing studies disagree on how overconfidence is defined and 
measured. Deaves, Luedes and Luo (2004) perform an asset market experiment, and find that 
overconfidence, measured as miscalibation, leads to higher trading frequency.  However, in their 
experiment, these authors do not find a correlation between gender and degree of miscalibration.  
Combining survey responses and trading records of German retail brokerage investors, Dorn and 
                                                 
5In the psychology literature, miscalibration can mean either ‘expected probability not equal to 
realized relative frequency’ or ‘believing that the precision of probability distribution is tighter 
than it really is.’  In our paper, miscalibration refers to the distribution for subjective probabilities 
being tighter than the true probability distribution.     9
Huberman (2003) show that there is no relation between trading frequency and their measure of 
overconfidence, i.e., an investor’s ‘illusion of knowledge,’ measured as the discrepancy between 
the investor’s self-assessed knowledge and his or her true knowledge about investments. Glaser 
and Weber (2005) argue that there are three aspects of overconfidence, namely miscalibration, the 
‘better-than-average’ effect (i.e., people tend to think that they have higher than average skills), 
and illusion-of-control (i.e., the tendency to believe that one’s personal probability of success is 
higher than an objective probability would warrant). Using data from 215 online investors, they 
find that, contrary to the predictions of Odean (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001), 
miscalibation does not lead to high trading frequency. However, the better-than-average effect is 
associated with more frequent trading. Glaser and Weber conjecture that an investor who believes 
himself to be better than average is more likely to invest according to his opinion about the future 
performance of a stock, even though he knows that other market participants disagree with him. 
This contributes to differences of opinion about a stock, which leads to trading.   
The competence effect is distinct from overconfidence.  In the overconfidence framework, 
the traditional paradigm of maximizing expected utility still holds.  Overconfidence increases 
trading frequency by increasing the heterogeneity of investor beliefs.  We argue that high 
competence leads to high trading frequency, through a different mechanism.  Investors are more 
willing to bet on their judgments when they feel more skillful or knowledgeable.  In other words, 
they are more likely to act on their beliefs, and trade securities, when they feel more competent, 
and vice versa.  Therefore, we hypothesize that when investors feel more competent, they tend to 
trade more frequently.  This ‘willingness to act’ aspect is absent in the overconfidence framework.   
 
II.C. Competence and Home Bias 
We now turn to the link between competence and an investor’s portfolio allocation to 
foreign assets.  The home bias literature shows that investors tend to allocate too much of their   10
overall portfolio to domestic equities and too little to international equities (French and Poterba 
(1991), Lewis (1999)).  Others have documented ‘home bias at home.’  Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) find that U.S. fund managers exhibit a strong preference for firms with local headquarters.  
Huberman (2001) reports the geographical bias of regional Bell shareholders, i.e., a larger 
proportion of the shareholders of a regional Bell operating company tend to live in its service area 
than would be expected.  Benartzi (2001) and Huberman and Sengmuller (2004) document that 
employees tend to invest a large proportion of the assets of their retirement plans in their own 
company’s stock.  Home bias at home has also been reported among Finnish (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001)), Swedish (Massa and Simonov (2005)), and Chinese (Feng and Seasholes 
(2004)) investors. 
What causes home bias?  One explanation is information costs.
6   Investing in foreign 
equity markets may require understanding foreign accounting standards and legal environments.  
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that fund managers earn an extra 2.7 percent per year from 
their local investments compared to non-local investments. Therefore, they argue that a regional 
information advantage leads to ‘home bias at home.’ Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) finds that high 
wealth households are more likely to invest in foreign assets than are low wealth households.  She 
argues that this is consistent with high wealth households paying the information cost associated 
with investing in foreign assets. However, several studies present evidence that cannot be 
                                                 
6Other potential explanations for home bias include a) domestic equities provide better hedges for 
domestic risks; b) high cost of investing in foreign equities, e.g., international taxes, government 
capital restrictions, etc.; and c) prevalence of closely held firms in most countries causing the 
world float portfolio to be significantly different from world market portfolio. Further, Demarzo 
et. al. (2004) argue that frictions in goods markets cause investors in a local community to hold 
similar, under-diversified portfolios. Most empirical studies suggest that these effects are either 
too small to account for the degree of home bias observed in the data, or actually increase the 
degree of the bias (Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Tesar and Werner 
(1995), and Dahlquist et al. (2003)). See Lewis (1999) for a review.     11
explained by the information cost argument.
7  Benartzi (2001) and Huberman (2001) find that 
investors who demonstrate local bias do not experience superior returns, nor do they tend to trade 
more frequently. These results are not easily explained by an information advantage story. The 
behavioral finance literature offers an alternative explanation, namely, people tend to be more 
optimistic towards home markets than towards international markets (Kilka and Weber (2000), 
Strong and Xu (2003)).      
In this paper, we argue that investor competence plays a role in explaining home bias.  
When an investor feels that he fully understands the benefits and risks involved in investing in 
foreign assets, he is more willing to take action to invest in foreign assets.  On the other hand, 
when an investor feels incompetent, he is likely to refrain from taking action, thus leading to 
underinvestment in foreign assets.  The same argument could be extended to home bias at home. 
Heath and Tversky’s analysis has often been used as evidence of a familiarity effect 
(Huberman (2001)).  Investors who are primarily familiar with their home country (versus being 
familiar with foreign countries) will have a tendency to invest primarily in home country stocks. 
But familiarity is not the whole story. Heath and Tversky (1991) emphasize that competence is 
more than familiarity.  The competence effect also evokes the feeling that an individual is good at 
investing in general, and in foreign stocks in particular.  A U.S. investor can be unfamiliar with 
foreign languages and cultures but if he feels competent in his investing skills, he might be 
willing to allocate part of his portfolio to foreign markets.   
One might be concerned that an investor’s self-rated competence is correlated with the 
level of information that the investor has. Thus, even if we do find foreign allocation to be 
increasing in investor competence, this could indicate an information advantage.  To address this 
concern, in section IV.B, we show that investor competence is not positively associated with an 
                                                 
7Using ownership data of individual Swedish firms, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) argue that 
foreign investors’ apparent preference for stocks with less information asymmetry is actually due 
to these investors being mainly institutional investors, not due to information costs.      12
investor’s past returns.  Therefore, in our sample, it is does not appear that investor competence is 
positively associated with the investor’s level of information. 
 
III. DATA SOURCES AND MEASURING COMPETENCE 
We use data from the UBS/Gallup Investor Survey.  Each month, UBS/Gallup conducts 
telephone interviews with approximately 1,000 randomly selected investors.  The only criterion 
for an investor to be included in the survey is that household total investment be more than 
$10,000.  The UBS data represent a general investor pool, and this is important because a 
particular class of investors might exhibit certain characteristics that distinguish them from the 
general population.  For example, Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean’s (2000, 2001, 2002) 
evidence of excessive trading is obtained from one particular subset of investors – investors who 
hold accounts with one discount brokerage firm.  Using data from a single 401(k) plan, Agnew et 
al. (2003) find that the average number of transactions per year is 0.26, less than one fifth of that 
reported in Odean (1999); and the annual asset turnover is 16 percent, less than one fourth of the 
turnover reported in Barber and Odean (2000).  The large discrepancies between these findings 
likely emanate from differences in behavior among different classes of investors. It is also 
possible that one investor may have multiple investment accounts, and manage these accounts 
differently due to institutional reasons, which might not be detected when studying one type of 
account.  Using the UBS/Gallup data, we avoid this issue by studying decisions pertaining to an 
investor’s aggregate investment portfolio. 
While the UBS data have the advantage of covering a wide range of investor classes and 
account types, there are disadvantages to using survey data. One can not be sure that respondents 
understand all the questions, nor that they answer truthfully. There can also be issues related to 
non-response bias (i.e., whether the respondent’s answers are representative of the views of the 
general population).  Also, the UBS data do not have detailed portfolio breakdowns at the   13
individual stock level, and for the most part we do not know respondents’ actual investment 
performance.  As reported below, when there is overlap, we are able to replicate the existing 
results in the literature. This gives us confidence that data deficiencies do not skew our results. 
The survey questions that are of particular interest to us are listed in Table I.  In the June 
1999 and April 2000 surveys, respondents are asked to report their trading frequencies.  The 
responses are coded in six categories, ranging from ‘at least once a day’ to ‘less than once a year.’  
In the March 2002, June 2002 and September 2002 surveys, participants are asked to report the 
percentages of their portfolios currently invested in assets of foreign countries or foreign 
currencies.   
Table II reports the characteristics of the investors surveyed by UBS/Gallup.  The investors 
are on average 49 years old, with median annual income of $67,500.  These numbers are 
comparable to that of Barber and Odean (2001), whose sample of investors are on average 50 
years old, with median annual income of $75,000.  The investors in our sample are well educated: 
60 percent have finished college, and 26 percent have post-graduate education.   
To measure investor competence, we use data from the November 1996 survey.  In this 
survey, investors are asked the following question: ‘How comfortable do you feel about your 
ability to understand investment products, alternatives and opportunities?’  The responses range 
from 1 (very uncomfortable) to 5 (very comfortable).  For the November 1996 survey, the 
average self-rated competence is 3.7. 
To perform our empirical analysis, we need simultaneous measures of investor competence 
and either trading frequency or the degree of home bias.  The survey question related to 
competence only appears in November 1996, which does not coincide with the appearance of 
either the trading frequency or the home bias questions.  Therefore, we construct an empirical 
model for investor competence.  In our analysis below, we use the estimated coefficients from   14
this model to construct predicted competence for each investor on any given survey, including 
those surveys that contain the trading frequency and home bias questions.   
We start by investigating the determinants of investor competence using the November 
1996 data.  We model competence as a function of investor characteristics such as gender, 
education, age and income.  Using an ordered logit regression, our proposed model includes three 
of these characteristics: gender, education, and income.  Age is dropped from the specification 
because it does not load significantly.  As specification tests, we perform the Pearson and 
deviance goodness-of-fit tests.  The Pearson goodness-of-fit test yields p-value of 0.29, while the 
deviance goodness-of-fit test has p-value of 0.18.  Both of these tests fail to provide evidence 
against the specification. 
   Recall that competence is defined as the subjective skill or knowledge level in a certain 
area (Heath and Tversky (1991)). In our setting, investor competence is an investor’s perceived 
financial skill or knowledge. We posited in section II.A that higher education and income make a 
person feel competent, which might lead to higher perceived competence in all domains, 
including financial decisions. As shown in Table III, the estimated coefficients indicate that 
investor competence increases in education. For example, consider an average investor in our 
sample, a male investor with annual income of $72,640. If his education level were to increase 
from college to post-graduate, the predicted competence for this investor would increase from 
4.00 to 4.11. Also consistent with our previous conjecture, investor competence increases with 
income. For the typical male, college-educated investor in our sample, if his income were to 
increase by one standard deviation from $72,640 to $97,835, the expected investor’s competence 
would increase from 4.00 to 4.07.  
Table III also shows that male investors are more likely to feel competent than female 
investors.  Comparing a college educated female investor, with annual income of $72,640, to a 
male investor with the same demographics, the gender differential accounts for an increase of   15
0.39 in predicted investor competence, from 3.61 to 4.00.  Notice that in previous studies, gender 
has been used as a proxy for overconfidence (Barber and Odean (2001)).  These authors argue 
that male investors are more overconfident than are female investors.  If being male indeed 
proxies for overconfidence, at least part of the increase in competence from 3.61 to 4.00 reflects 
the effect of overconfidence on competence that we described at the end of Section II.A.  As 
described below, we also include gender as a stand-alone variable in some of the analysis that 
follows, to separately identify any effect of overconfidence that occurs outside of the competence 
channel. Finally, to investigate whether our competence variable is in fact distinct from 
overconfidence, we examine the correlation between competence and gender, which is a dummy 
variable, set to 1 if the investor is male, and 0 otherwise. The correlation between competence 
and gender is only 0.21 in the November 1996 data, indicating that our competence measure has 
unique variation, distinct from overconfidence (as proxied by male gender). We examine 
overconfidence more below. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF COMPETENCE ON INVESTOR BEHAVIOR 
IV.A. Investor Competence and Trading Frequency 
Using our model of competence, we now investigate the relation between competence and 
trading frequency. Barber and Odean (2001) find that young, male investors tend to trade more 
frequently than older, female investors. Using Survey of Consumer Finance data, Vissing-
Jørgensen (2004) finds that wealthier households tend to trade more frequently. Therefore, we 
control for gender, age, and income when studying trading frequency.  We use income to proxy 
for wealth because our data do not have a direct measure of wealth.  
Table IV reports univariate relations between trading frequency, investor competence, and 
other characteristics. Recall that in Section II.B, we hypothesized that higher perceived   16
competence increases an investor’s propensity to act on his beliefs, and therefore competence 
should be positively associated with trading frequency.  The results in Table IV are consistent 
with this hypothesis.  We observe a significant shift in the distribution of trading frequency as 
investor competence changes.  When competence is less than or equal to 4.0, 27.5 percent of 
investors trade at least once a month.  When competence is greater than 4.0, 44.8 percent of 
investors trade at least once a month.  Overall, the average number of days between trading for all 
investors is 93.7 days.  For those investors with competence less than or equal to 4.0, the average 
number of days between trading is 109.3 days.  In contrast, for those investors with competence 
greater than 4.0, the average number of days between trading is only 67.9 days.  This large 
difference in days between trading is both economically and statistically significant and is 
consistent with more competent investors trading more frequently. 
Given that we use survey data while many existing studies use actual trading data, it is 
important to determine whether our sample produces results similar to those in the extant 
literature.  The results in Table IV indicate that young, male investors and investors with higher 
income tend to trade more frequently than older, female investors and investors with lower 
income. (These findings are confirmed in a multivariate setting in column 2 of Table V.)  These 
results are consistent with the findings of Barber and Odean (2001) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2004). 
Therefore, we find no evidence that the source of our data (i.e., a survey) is distorting our results.  
So far, we have presented univariate analysis.  In Table V, we perform ordered logit 
regressions to explore the relative importance of each variable in explaining trading frequency. 
We code the six categories of trading frequency as follows: category = 1 if trading frequency is 
‘less than once a year’; 2 if ‘at least once a year, but not more than once a quarter’; 3 if ‘at least 
once a quarter, but not more than once a month’; 4 if ‘at least once a month, but not more than 
once a week’; 5 if ‘at least once a week, but not more than once a day’; 6 if ‘at least once a day.’    17
The regression results in the first column of Table V suggest that the effect of competence on 
trading frequency is positive and highly significant.   
The positive coefficient estimate indicates that trading frequency increases with investor 
competence. The effect of competence is very large in magnitude.  When investor competence 
increases by one standard deviation, from its mean level of 3.75 to 4.07,
8 the probability of an 
investor trading more than once per week increases from 9.6 percent to 15.5 percent.  While this 
increase in trading frequency is large, it is consistent with the magnitude of other implications 
from the data. Recall that holding income and education constant at the population averages, male 
investor competence minus female investor competence equals 0.39.  From Table IV, we know 
that this 0.39 increase in competence leads to an increase in the proportion of investors who trade 
at least once per week from 8.5 percent (for female investors) to 13.4 percent (for male investors). 
Thus, the gender effect is on par with the one standard deviation competence effect described 
above. 
Next we introduce investor demographics as control variables: gender, education, age and 
income. Recall that investor competence is estimated using gender, education, and income; 
therefore, competence is highly correlated with these characteristics.  To address the issue of 
multicollinearity, we orthogonalize the characteristic variables as follows.  First, we estimate a 
logit regression using Male as the response variable, and investor competence as the explanatory 
variable.  A new variable, MaleX, is computed as the residual of this regression.  MaleX 
represents the variation in Male that is not captured by investor competence.  The same procedure 
is repeated several times to produce orthogonalized versions of the College, Post-Graduate, and 
Income variables.     
                                                 
8Mean competence is 3.68 in November 1996 survey, in which competence is measured by 
investors’ actual responses to a survey question.  For the two subsets of sample with sufficient 
demographic information to perform the regressions in Table V and Table VIII, investor 
competence is calculated using the model presented in Table III.  For these two sub-samples, 
mean competence is 3.75, and standard deviation is 0.32.   18
In column 3 of Table V, we regress trading frequency on competence and the 
orthogonalized demographic variables.  In this specification, the competence variable captures the 
effects of gender, education, and income on trading frequency that occur via the competence 
channel.  The orthogonalized ‘X’ variables capture the effects of gender, education, and income 
that are independent of the competence channel. 
In column 3, the coefficient for investor competence is positive and highly significant.  The 
estimated coefficient is 1.525, which is very similar to 1.697, the coefficient estimate in column 1, 
where investor competence is the only explanatory variable.
9 Interestingly, the coefficient for 
MaleX is not significant.  In other words, investor competence captures most of the variation in 
Male that is associated with trading frequency.  Barber and Odean (2001) argue that male 
investors tend to trade more frequently than female investors because male investors are more 
overconfident.  Our results offer an alternative perspective: more frequent trading by male 
investors could be driven by investor competence.  Neither of the coefficients for CollegeX or 
Post-GraduateX is statistically significant, which suggests that investor competence also captures 
the effect of education on trading frequency.  In other words, it is possible that education leads to 
feelings of competence, which in turn lead to an increase in trading frequency – but we find no 
evidence of an independent education effect.  The coefficient estimate for IncomeX is 0.013 and 
is statistically significant.  This implies that only part of the effect of income on trading frequency 
is due to its effect on investor competence.   
There exists a large and influential literature in financial economics that studies the effect 
of overconfidence on trading frequency.  For example, as discussed above, Barber and Odean 
(2001) argue that male investors tend to be more overconfident than female investors, leading 
male investors to trade more frequently than female investors.  More recently, Glaser and Weber 
                                                 
9Notice that the “X” variables are residuals from logit regressions.  They are not linear functions 
of Competence.  Therefore, as is evident in Table V, column 3, adding the “X” variables as 
explanatory variables can change the estimated Competence coefficient.   19
(2005) report that the ‘better-than-average’ aspect of overconfidence is associated with higher 
trading frequency.  In Table V, we show that more frequent trading by male investors could be 
driven by investor competence, rather than an independent overconfidence effect.  Gender, 
however, does not perfectly proxy for overconfidence, so our efforts thus far may not have 
completely disentangled the two effects.  In the analysis below, we further investigate how our 
results hold up when we control for other measures of overconfidence.     
In the first three columns of Table VI, we attempt to control for the ‘better-than-average’ 
aspect of overconfidence in the multivariate analysis.  Here the ‘better-than-average’ effect, 
called ‘Overconfidence’ in the regressions, is measured by an investor’s forecast of his own 
portfolio return over the next twelve months minus his forecast of the stock market return over 
the next twelve months.  As shown in Table II, on average, an investor forecasts his own portfolio 
return to be 3.2 percent higher than the market return over the next twelve months. For the June 
1999 and April 2000 surveys, the correlation between this measure of overconfidence and 
investor gender (equal to 1 if the investor is male, 0 if female) is 0.08, which is statistically 
significant at 0.05 level. The correlation between constructed competence and overconfidence for 
the June 1999 and April 2000 surveys is only 0.04, which is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
this measure of overconfidence is consistent with other finance research that documents a male 
overconfidence effect, while at the same time it is statistically distinct from the competence effect 
that we focus on in this paper.  As shown in Table VI, column 1, after controlling for ‘better than 
average’ overconfidence, the effect of competence remains highly statistically significant.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient decreases only slightly, relative to the univariate regression 
coefficient reported in Table V, column 1.  Better than average overconfidence is positively and 
significantly related to trading frequency in column 1. 
So far, we have considered two proxies for overconfidence and have shown that investor 
competence is a significant determinant of trading frequency, controlling for these proxies of   20
overconfidence.  Besides using direct proxies for overconfidence, we now consider an indirect 
approach, which deals with another aspect of overconfidence.  Recall that we define investor 
competence as the self-perceived ability to understand investment opportunities.  One could think 
of overconfidence as the difference between self-perceived investment ability and an investor’s 
true ability: Overconfidence = Competence – True Ability.  Therefore, if competence drives 
trading frequency, we have the ordered logit regression model:  
                                i i j
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In the UBS surveys, investors are asked to forecast the stock market return over the next twelve 
months.  We use these forecasts as a measure of “true ability”. Define ForecastError as the 
absolute value of the forecasted minus the realized return over the next twelve months.  If 
overconfidence drives trading frequency, and assuming an investor’s true ability is measured as 
(δ0 + δ1*ForecastError), i.e., the smaller the forecast error, the higher the true ability, then the 
regression model should be: 
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Therefore, if competence and forecast error are both included as explanatory variables for trading 
frequency, the competence story would predict that only the coefficient estimate for investor 
competence is statistically significant, while the coefficient estimate for forecast error should be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  In contrast, the overconfidence story would predict the 
coefficient estimate for forecast error to be different from zero.  These predictions are tested in 
columns 4 and 5 of Table VI.  Since we use data from two surveys conducted at different times,   21
i.e., June 1999 and April 2000, forecast errors are de-meaned by survey to avoid the influence of 
general market conditions at the time of the survey.  In both columns, the coefficient estimate for 
forecast error is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, while the coefficient estimate 
for investor competence remains positive and highly statistically significant.  These results are 
consistent with the prediction of the competence story and inconsistent with the prediction of the 
overconfidence explanation.         
The results in Tables IV, V, and VI are consistent with our first hypothesis: trading 
frequency increases with investor competence.  Now we turn to our second hypothesis: higher 
investor competence leads to less home bias. 
 
IV.B. Investor Competence and Home Bias 
In the March 2002, June 2002, and September 2002 surveys, investors report their foreign 
asset holdings (see Table I).  We use these data to investigate the relation between investor 
competence and home bias.   
Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) reports that wealthier households tend to hold more foreign 
assets.  Therefore, we control for income (our closest proxy to wealth) when we model home bias.  
Kilka and Weber (2000) find that people are more optimistic towards their home markets than 
they are about international markets.  Strong and Xu (2003) simultaneously survey fund managers 
around the world and find a strong tendency for managers to be more optimistic about their home 
country market than about the rest of the world.  The authors of both of these papers suggest that 
home bias is driven by this optimism.  Therefore, when studying the relation between investor 
competence and home bias, we attempt to control for investor optimism towards the U.S. market. 
In February 2002, May 2002, August 2002 and November 2002, investors respond to the 
following question: ‘Focus on the financial markets in four areas of the world and rank order   22
them by how optimistic you feel about them.  The financial markets are: in the United States, in 
Europe, in Japan, in countries often referred to as the emerging markets.’ We define a dummy 
variable, OptimismUS, equal to 1 if an investor is the most optimistic towards the U.S. markets, 
and zero otherwise.  Overall, 72 percent of investors are more optimistic towards the U.S. market 
than towards financial markets in other regions of the world. 
Since the optimism question is not asked in March 2002, June 2002, or September 2002 
(the surveys that address foreign investing/home bias), we do not have a direct measure for 
OptimismUS for these surveys.  Therefore, we construct an empirical model of optimism towards 
the U.S. market in the same manner as we did for investor competence.  We start by investigating 
the determinants of investor optimism towards the U.S. market using data from the February 
2002, May 2002, August 2002 and November 2002 surveys.  We regress OptimismUS on 
investor characteristics, like gender, education, age and income.  Then for all other surveys, we 
construct predicted optimism towards the U.S. market for each investor, using his individual 
characteristics and the coefficients obtained from the regression above. The mean fitted 
OptimismUS is 0.72.  The correlation between fitted OptimsmUS and fitted investor competence 
is 0.27. 
One might think that an investor’s optimism towards the U.S. market is affected by current 
performance of the U.S. market, as well as investor demographics.  To address this possibility, we 
repeat the analysis allowing OptimismUS to be a function of both investor characteristics and 
performance of the U.S. market, e.g., the concurrent return of S&P500 index, or University of 
Michigan’s consumer sentiment index.  The results are very similar to those reported below.  
Table VII reports univariate relations between home bias and investor competence, 
optimism towards the U.S. market, gender, education, age, and income.  There is significant 
home bias in our sample.  Overall, 36.3 percent of all investors hold foreign assets.  The 
remaining 63.7 percent of investors do not own any foreign assets.  For those investors with   23
competence less than or equal to 4.0, only 31.9 percent hold foreign assets.  In comparison, when 
investor competence is greater than 4.0, 47.0 percent invest in foreign assets.  This increase is 
highly significant, both economically and statistically.  This evidence is consistent with our 
hypothesis that investor competence mitigates home bias.   
The results in the table also permit the analysis of optimism towards the U.S. market.  If 
home bias is caused by optimism towards the home market, then higher OptimismUS should be 
associated with less foreign holdings.  Indeed, when fitted OptimismUS is less than its average 
value of 0.72, 38.4 percent of investors choose to hold foreign assets.  However, when 
OptimismUS is greater than 0.72, only 34.5 percent of investors choose to invest in international 
markets.  The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Although not a main focus of 
our study, this observed relation between home bias and OptimismUS is important.  Existing 
papers like Kilka and Weber (2000) and Strong and Xu (2003) focus on optimism only; they do 
not study portfolio allocation.  Therefore, these papers do not establish a direct link between 
optimism towards the home market and actual portfolio allocation.  Our study links home market 
optimism with foreign asset holdings. 
Multivariate logit regression results are reported in Table VIII.  The response variable is a 
dummy variable, set to 1 if an investor holds foreign assets.  The first column of Table VIII 
shows that investors with higher competence are more likely to hold foreign assets, and investors 
with higher optimism towards the U.S. market are less likely to hold foreign assets.  The 
coefficients for both investor competence and OptimismUS have the predicted signs and are 
significant at the 0.01 level. Importantly, the magnitude and significance of the competence 
variable is robust to the inclusion of the optimism variable.  
As discussed in Lewis (1999), most of the existing rational models fail to generate effects 
large enough to account for the magnitude of home bias observed in the data.  Therefore, it is 
important to analyze the economic significance of investor competence.  It turns out that the   24
effect of competence is economically very large.  Holding OptimismUS constant at its mean of 
0.72, when investor competence increases by one standard deviation from 3.75 to 4.07, the 
likelihood of an investor holding foreign assets increases from 36.6 percent to 47.1 percent.   
Holding OptimismUS at its mean of 0.72, if investor competence increases to its maximum of 5, 
the probability that an investor holds foreign assets increases to 75.9 percent.  Therefore, our 
estimated effects of investor competence on home bias are economically large. 
We next investigate whether the positive association between fitted investor competence 
and foreign asset holdings is due to the positive association between competence and education.  
It is possible that investors with better education are more likely to learn the benefits of 
international diversification, and therefore are more likely to hold foreign assets.  To address this 
concern, we study whether the effects of investor competence and OptimismUS remain when we 
control for other investor characteristics, like gender, education, age and income.   
Similar to the trading frequency analysis, because fitted competence and fitted 
OptimismUS are estimated using investor’s gender, education, age, and income information, 
these variables are correlated with each other.  We repeat the orthogonalization process described 
in Section IV.A.  For example, we regress Male on Competence and OptimismUS.  The residuals 
of this regression, called MaleX, represent the variation in Male that is not captured by 
Competence and OptimismUS.  
The fourth column of Table VIII reports the effect of Competence on home bias, with 
OptimismUS and the orthogonalized investor characteristics as control variables.  The estimated 
coefficient of the Competence variable is highly significant and has the predicted sign.  These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis that investors who feel more competent are more likely 
to participate in foreign markets.  Interestingly, in Column 4, after the orthogonalization, none of 
the investor characteristic variables are statistically significant.  This result suggests that these 
investor characteristics affect home bias via the competence and/or optimism channels.  In   25
particular, both CollegeX and PostGraduateX have statistically insignificant coefficients, so the 
only effect of education on home bias that we detect is through the competence and/or optimism 
channel. 
As we discussed in Section II.C, an information story might explain home bias.  For 
example, if the competence variable captures an investor’s information advantage, instead of 
perceived knowledge/skills, our results might indicate that an information advantage increases an 
investor’s likelihood of holding foreign assets.  To distinguish between competence and 
information, one needs to distinguish between perceived knowledge/skills and actual information.  
We do this by considering the relation between information and returns.  Investors who are better 
informed should earn higher returns than those less informed.  However, investors who perceive 
themselves to be better informed may not earn higher returns.  Therefore, if our measure of 
investor competence captures subjectively perceived knowledge instead of true information, then 
there is no reason for it to be positively associated with realized abnormal returns.   
In Table IX, we study the relation between investor competence and realized portfolio 
returns over the twelve months prior to the survey.
 10  To control for market conditions, we add 
fixed effects for each survey.  We find no evidence that investor competence is associated with 
higher returns.  In fact, the data indicate the contrary: a one-unit increase in investor competence 
is associated with decrease in annual returns by more than 7 percent.  The evidence in Table IX 
suggests that it is unlikely that our investor competence variable is simply capturing an 
information effect.    
                                                 
10In Table IX, White (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors for coefficient estimates 
are reported.  One might be concerned that investors with similar degree of competence may hold 
similar portfolios, which can result in clustered errors in the regressions in Table IX.  To deal 
with this concern, we repeat the regressions allowing for the model errors to be clustered based 
on levels of competence.  The resulting standard errors for coefficient estimates are similar to 
those reported in Table IX.   26
We do not have investors’ actual portfolio holding data; therefore, we do not control for 
individual investors’ risk exposure in the regressions in Table IX.  Is it possible that investors 
with lower competence tend to take on more risk, and therefore earn higher returns on average?  
To address this possibility, for each survey, we calculate the mean self-reported portfolio returns 
for high and low competence investors.  According to the CAPM, if low competence investors 
tend to take on more risk than high competence investors, then the mean returns for low 
competence investors should be more sensitive to market returns than those of high competence 
investors.  As we show in Figure II, this is not the case.  The mean returns for both low and high 
competence investors are equally sensitive to market returns (i.e., the slopes on the lines are 
indistinguishable).  There is no evidence that low competence investors take on more risk than 
high competence investors.  Therefore, it does not appear to be the case that risk exposures drive 
the results in Table IX.            
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The competence effect predicts that the likelihood that a person will invest according to her 
own judgment increases with her perceived knowledge about investing.  Unlike many empirical 
studies of behavioral finance, which rely on proxies for underlying psychological biases, we 
directly measure investor competence through survey evidence.  We first build an empirical 
model to understand the factors that affect investor competence. We find that male investors, and 
investors with higher income or more education, are more likely to perceive themselves as 
competent investors than are female investors, and investors with lower income or less education.    
We study the effect of competence on investor behavior.  The majority of existing 
empirical studies in behavioral finance use one psychological bias to explain one type of investor 
behavior.  However, if a psychological bias is deeply ingrained, it should affect multiple aspects 
of investor behavior.  In this paper, we study the effect of investor competence on two types of   27
investor behavior: trading frequency and home bias.  Trading frequency and home bias have long 
been treated separately in the literature.  However, we show in this paper that both of these 
behaviors can be linked to investor competence. 
We argue that investors who believe that they are more skillful or knowledgeable in 
making financial decisions should be more willing to act on their judgments.  Indeed, our results 
indicate that investors who feel more competent tend to trade more frequently than investors who 
feel less competent.  The competence effect also contributes to home bias.  When an investor 
feels more competent about investing in foreign assets, he is more willing to shift a portion of his 
assets overseas.  In contrast, when an investor feel less competent, he is more likely to avoid 
investing in foreign assets.  Consistent with this argument, we find that investors with higher 
competence are less likely to exhibit home bias.    28
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Survey Questions, from UBS/Gallup Investor Survey 
 
 
 Survey  Questions  Data  Availability 
Trading Frequency  In general, how often do you trade in 
the financial markets?   
 
June 1999 
April 2000  
 
Home  Bias  What percent of your portfolio is 
currently in assets of foreign countries 
or foreign currencies? 
 
March 2002 
June 2002   
September 2002 
 
Investor competence  How  comfortable do you feel about 
your ability to understand investment 
products, alternatives and 
opportunities?  
The responses range from 1 (very 
uncomfortable) to 5 (very comfortable). 
 
November 1996 
Overconfidence  What overall rate of return do you 
expect to get on your portfolio in the 
next twelve months? 
 
 
What overall rate of return do you think 
the stock market will provide investors 












Optimism toward U.S. market  Focus on the financial markets in four 
areas of the world and rank order them 
by how optimistic you feel about them.  
The financial markets are: in the United 
States, in Europe, in Japan, in countries 












Optimism towards the U.S. market is defined as follows.  An investor rank orders financial markets from 
four areas of the world by how optimistic he feels about them.  The financial markets are: the United States, 
Europe, Japan, and emerging markets.  Optimism towards the U.S. market is set to 1 if an investor is the 
most optimistic towards the U.S. market, set to 0 otherwise.  Overconfidence is defined as the margin by 
which an investor thinks that his own portfolio return could beat the market return over the next twelve 
months.  Overconfidence is calculated as follows: (forecast of own portfolio return over the next twelve 
months) minus (forecast of stock market return over the next twelve months).  Data are from the following 
surveys: November 1996, June 1999, April 2000, February 2002, March 2002, May 2002, June 2002, 
August 2002, September 2002 and November 2002.  The total number of observations is 7,452.   
 
 Percent  Mean  (Median)  Std  Dev 
Competence (1=low, 5=high) 
 
 3.68  (4.00) 1.01 
Optimism towards U.S. market 
(1 = the most optimistic towards U.S. market,   
0 = the most optimistic towards a non-U.S. market) 
  
 0.72  (1.00) 0.45 
Overconfidence (%) 
 
 3.20  (0.00)  17.09 
Education      
    Less than college  40.02%     
    College  33.76%     
    Post-Graduate  26.22%     
      
Investment     $199,643 
($55,000) 
$254,061 
    $10,000 - $100,000  58.62%     
    $100,000 - $200,000   16.45%     
    $200,000 - $500,000  13.90%     
    $500,000 - $1 million  6.49%     
    More than $1 million  4.54%     
      
Income     $72,640 
($67,500) 
$25,195 
    Less than $50,000  23.22%     
    $50,000 - $100,000  46.07%     
    More than $100,000  30.70%     
      
Gender      
    Male  59.15%     
    Female  40.85%     
      
Age     48.70 (48.00)  13.95 
     < 30  7.63%     
    30 – 40  22.46%     
    40 – 50  28.34%     
    50 – 60  22.31%     
    >= 60   19.26%     
      
Self-reported previous one year return (%)       
    All surveys    2.09 (5.00)  21.02   32
Table III 
Determinants of Investor Competence 
 
Investor competence is measured as the response to the following survey question: “How comfortable do 
you feel about your ability to understand investment products, alternatives and opportunities?”  The 
responses range from 1 (very uncomfortable) to 5 (very comfortable).  An ordered logit regression is 
estimated.  College and Post-Graduate are dummy variables which are set to 1 if an investor reports an 
education level of college and post-graduate respectively, and 0 otherwise.  Male is a dummy variable, 
equal to 1 if the investor is male; 0 if the investor is female.  Income is categorical.  We take the mid-point 
of each category.  The top category for income is “more than $100,000 per year.”  Income in this category 
is set to equal to $100,000.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  Data are from 
the November 1996 survey.   
 
 Estimate  Std  Err 
Intercept 5  -2.499
***  0.202 
Intercept 4  -0.893
***  0.182 
Intercept 3  1.022
***  0.190 
Intercept 2  2.669
***  0.280 
Male 0.762
***  0.138 
College 0.692
***  0.165 
Post-Graduate 0.909
***  0.186 
Income 0.005
**  0.002 
Pseudo R
2  0.115  
No. of observations  744   




This table presents the distribution of trading frequency.  Competence is estimated using investor characteristics that measure gender, education, and income.  
Overconfidence is defined as the forecast of investor’s own portfolio return minus forecast of market return over the next 12 months.  “Days between trading” is 
calculated at the mid-point of each response category.  We test the effect of investor characteristics by comparing average number of days between trading at the 
lowest response value of a given variable with the average number of days between trading at higher response values.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10, respectively.  Data are from June 1999 and April 2000 surveys.   
 
  At least once 
a day 
At least once 
a week 
At least once a 
month 
At least once a 
quarter 






All investors  3.1%  11.6%  34.0%  75.7%  93.7%  93.7  670 
Competence            
   
    <= 4  2.9%  10.8%  27.5%  69.6%  91.9%  109.3  418 
    > 4  3.6%  13.1%  44.8%  85.7%  96.8%  67.9
***  252 
Overconfidence           
    <= 3.2%  2.8%  9.5%  32.5%  72.8%  93.1%  100.4  422 
    > 3.2%  3.6%  15.3%  36.7%  80.7%  94.8%  82.3
**  248 
Gender              
    Male  3.5%  13.4%  40.3%  82.0%  95.6%  77.6  434 
    Female  2.5%  8.5%  22.5%  64.0%  90.2%  123.4
***  236 
Education              
    Less than college  3.6%  11.8%  25.6%  68.2%  89.7%  115.2  195 
    College  2.4%  11.5%  35.3%  78.2%  96.4%  85.4
***  252 
    Post-Graduate  3.6%  11.7%  39.9%  79.4%  94.2%  84.5
***  223 
Age              
    <30  3.0%  21.2%  47.0%  87.9%  97.0%  66  62.0 
    30 – 40  6.4%  12.3%  39.0%  84.5%  98.4%  70.3  187 
    40 – 50  2.5%  10.5%  28.5%  70.5%  92.5%  106.6
***  200 
    50 – 60  1.6%  11.3%  35.5%  75.8%  93.6%  93.3
**  124 
    >= 60   0.0%  6.4%  24.7%  60.2%  84.9%  136.4
***  93 
Income              
    Less than $50,000  1.2%  4.7%  18.8%  56.5%  84.7%  145.7  85 
    $50,000 - $100,000  1.3%  9.0%  28.0%  71.7%  92.5%  105.1
***  321 
    More than $100,000  6.1%  17.0%  46.2%  86.7%  98.1%  63.2
***  264 
  34 
Table V 
Investor Competence and Trading Frequency 
 
We estimate the impact of investor competence and other investor attributes on trading frequency using 
ordered logit regressions.  The response variable is trading frequency.  There are six categories, coded as 
following: category = 1 if trading frequency is “less than once a year”; category = 2 if trading frequency is 
“at least once a year, but not more than once a quarter”; category = 3 if trading frequency is “at least once a 
quarter, but not more than once a month”; category = 4 if trading frequency is “at least once a month, but 
not more than once a week”; category = 5 if trading frequency is “at least once a week, but not more than 
once a day”; category = 6 if trading frequency is “at least once a day.”  Competence is estimated using 
investor characteristics that measure gender, education, and income (see Table III).  College and Post-
Graduate are dummy variables that are set to 1 if an investor reports an education level of college and post-
graduate respectively, and 0 otherwise.  Male is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the investor is male; 0 if 
the investor is female.  Income is categorical.  We take the mid-point of each category.  The top category 
for income is “more than $100,000 per year.”  Income in this category is set to $100,000.  MaleX is the 
residual of the following logit regression: regress Male onto Competence.  CollegeX, Post-GraduateX, and 
IncomeX are calculated in the same manner.  Intercepts are not reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  Data are from June 1999 and April 2000 
surveys. 
    
 























































2  0.075 0.133  0.134 
No. of obs  670  670  670 
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Table VI 
Investor Competence, Overconfidence, and Trading Frequency 
 
We investigate the impact of investor competence on trading frequency, controlling for overconfidence and 
other investor attributes.  Ordered logit regressions are estimated.  The response variable is trading 
frequency.  There are six categories, coded as following: category = 1 if trading frequency is “less than 
once a year”; category = 2 if trading frequency is “at least once a year, but not more than once a quarter”; 
category = 3 if trading frequency is “at least once a quarter, but not more than once a month”; category = 4 
if trading frequency is “at least once a month, but not more than once a week”; category = 5 if trading 
frequency is “at least once a week, but not more than once a day”; category = 6 if trading frequency is “at 
least once a day.”  Competence is estimated using investor characteristics that measure gender, education, 
and income (see Table III).  Overconfidence is measured as (forecast of own portfolio return over the next 
twelve months – forecast of stock market return over the next twelve months).  ForecastError is calculated 
in two steps.  First, the absolute value of (forecast of overall return of the stock market over the next twelve 
months minus the realized return of the stock market over the next twelve months) is obtained.  Then, the 
mean absolute forecast error of all respondents for the particular survey, i.e., June 1999 survey or April 
2000 survey, is subtracted from the individual absolute forecast errors to arrive at ForecastError.  College 
and Post-Graduate are dummy variables that are set to 1 if an investor reports an education level of college 
and post-graduate respectively, and 0 otherwise.  Male is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the investor is 
male; 0 if the investor is female.  Income is categorical.  We take the mid-point of each category.  The top 
category for income is “more than $100,000 per year.”  Income in this category is set to $100,000.  MaleX 
is the residual of the following logit regression: regress Male onto Competence.  CollegeX, Post-GraduateX, 
and IncomeX are calculated in the same manner.  Intercepts are not reported.  Standard errors are in 




significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  Data are from June 1999 and April 2000 surveys. 
    
 
































































































2  0.080  0.137 0.129 0.078  0.135 
No.  of  obs  670  670 670 670  670 




Percentage of investors who own foreign investments.  Competence is estimated using investor 
characteristics that measure gender, education, and income.  OptimismUS is estimated using investor 
characteristics that measure gender, education, age, and income.  We test the effect of investor 
characteristics by comparing the decision to invest in foreign assets at the lowest response value of a given 
variable with the decision to invest in foreign assets at higher response values.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  Data are from March 2002, June 2002 and September 2002 surveys.  
The total number of observations is 2,483.   
 




All investors  36.3%  901 
Competence      
    <= 4  31.9%  560 
    > 4  47.0%
***  341 
OptimismUS    
    <= 0.72  38.4%  437 
    > 0.72  34.5%
**  464 
Gender    
    Male  39.1%  578 
    Female  32.2%
***  323 
Education    
    Less than college  27.4%  272 
    College  37.9%
***  328 
    Post-Graduate  48.1%
***  301 
Age    
    <30  33.9%  64 
    30 – 40  43.0%
**  233 
    40 – 50  38.8%  273 
    50 – 60  35.2%  194 
    >= 60   27.5%  137 
Income    
    Less than $50,000  24.8%  135 
    $50,000 - $100,000  36.4%
***  435 
    More than $100,000  44.6%
***  331   37
Table VIII 
Investor Competence and Home Bias 
 
We study the impact of investor competence and other investor attributes on home bias using logit 
regressions.  The dependent variable is participation in foreign assets, equal to 1 if investor holds foreign 
assets, and 0 otherwise.  Competence is estimated using investor characteristics that measure gender, 
education, and income.  OptimismUS is estimated using investor characteristics that measure gender, 
education, age, and income.  College and Post-Graduate are dummy variables that are set to 1 if an investor 
reports an education level of college and post-graduate respectively, and 0 otherwise.  Male is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if the investor is male; 0 if the investor is female.  Income is categorical.  We take the 
mid-point of each category.  The top category for income is “more than $100,000 per year.”  Income in this 
category is set to $100,000.  MaleX is the residual of the following logit regression: regress Male onto 
Competence and OptimismUS.  CollegeX, Post-GraduateX, ageX, and IncomeX are calculated the same 
way.  Data are from March 2002, June 2002, and September 2002.  Intercepts are not reported.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.   
 
 



































































2  0.050 0.045  0.064  0.064 
No. of obs  2483  2483  2483  2483 
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Table IX 
Investor Competence and Realized Returns 
 
The association between investor competence and realized returns is studied using OLS regressions.  The 
dependent variable is an investor’s self-reported return of the previous twelve months, measured in 
percentage.  Competence is estimated using investor characteristics that measure gender, education, and 
income.  OptimismUS is estimated using investor characteristics that measure gender, education, age, and 
income.  Mar02 is a dummy variable, set to 1 if the data are from March 2002 survey, zero otherwise.  
June02 is defined similarly.  Self-reported return of the previous twelve months is winsorized at 0.01 and 




* denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.   
 
 




























2  0.042 0.041 
No. of obs  1723  1723 
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Figure I 
Percentage of Participants that Choose Their Own Judgments over Matched Chance Lotteries 
 
The horizontal axis is the self-rated probability of a participant’s judgment being correct.  The vertical axis 
is the percentage of participants that choose their own judgments over matched chance lotteries.  This 
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Figure II 
Market Risk Exposure of Low Competence and High Competence Investors 
 
The horizontal axis is the previous twelve months return of S&P500 index.  The vertical axis is the mean 
portfolio returns for low and high competence investors for the same twelve months.  Low competence is 
defined as competence less than or equal to 4.0; high competence is defined as competence greater than 4.0.  
▲represents low competence investors, ♦ represents high competence investors.  Data are from March 2002, 












-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
Previous Year S&P500 Index Return
M
e
a
n
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
P
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
High Competence
Low Competence
 
 